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Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of biddersâ€™ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012098851

First-price auctions with general information structures : implications for bidding and revenue

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 1, pp. 107-143

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738468