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Authority and incentives in organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If the CEO is more efficient than the division heads (i.e., the CEO …'s costs from exerting high effort are smaller than those of the division heads), the owner will prefer full delegation to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293168
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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating issue, but partial delegation if selfish behavior is … delegation of authority to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private benefits of control. In that …, but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimal for cooperation being crucial. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333761
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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
the CEO, then centralization or partial delegation can also be optimal. … based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If the CEO is more efficient than the division heads (i.e., the CEO …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312979
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Authority and incentives in organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
the CEO, then centralization or partial delegation can also be optimal. … based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If the CEO is more efficient than the division heads (i.e., the CEO …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748623
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Authority and incentives in organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating issue, but partial delegation if selfish behavior is … delegation of authority to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private benefits of control. In that …, but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimal for cooperation being crucial. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198507
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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating issue, but partial delegation if selfish behavior is … delegation of authority to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private benefits of control. In that …, but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimal for cooperation being crucial. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699425
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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If the CEO is more efficient than the division heads (i.e., the CEO …'s costs from exerting high effort are smaller than those of the division heads), the owner will prefer full delegation to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632999
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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2013
the CEO, then centralization or partial delegation can also be optimal. … based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical … delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If the CEO is more efficient than the division heads (i.e., the CEO …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010617907
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Contracts and Insurance Group Formation by Myopic Players
Borm, Peter; Lazarova, E.A.; van Velzen, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005
This paper employs a cooperative approach to insurance group formation problems.The insurance group formation is analyzed in terms of stability with respect to one-person deviations.Depending on the exact contractual setting, three stability concepts are proposed: individual, contractual and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090669
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The Coase mechanism and the iteration argument
Schlicht, Ekkehart - 2017
The "iteration argument" presented in Schlicht (1996) shows that the allocation of property rights may generate inefficiencies, contrary to what the "Coase Theorem", as commonly understood, asserts. The argument may be summarized by saying that markets (and bargaining) cease to function properly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626628