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Minimum cost spanning tree problems connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points and the cost of using an edge is fixed. The folk and cycle-complete cost sharing solutions always offer core allocations. We provide similar characterizations for both. A new...
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This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318970
Game Theory describes human interaction involving conflict, cooperation and competition, the term Interpersonal Decision Theory is synonymous. The term reflects the fact that most essential features of this field are manifested in parlor games. This topic-level treatment covers large parts of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272574
Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976645
Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011141073
We introduce cooperative TU-games on concept lattices, where a concept is a pair (S,S') with S being a subset of players or objects, and S' a subset of attributes. Any such game induces a game on the set of players/objects, which appears to be a TU-game whose collection of feasible coalitions is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098344
In this paper we introduce three-valued simple games as a natural extension<br/>of simple games. While simple games are used to evaluate single voting systems, three-valued simple games offer the opportunity for a simultaneous analysis of two different voting systems within the same parliamentary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268490
In this paper we introduce the concept of quasi-building set that may underlie the coalitional structure of a cooperative game with restricted communication between the players. Each feasible coalition, including the set of all players, contains a nonempty subset called the choice set of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092854