Showing 1 - 10 of 17
In a game with positive externalities, such as e.g. the standard environmental externality game used in the analysis of international environmental agreements, the solutions having the property of coalitional internal stability, when they exist, are compared in this paper with the solutions with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246306
Sharing a damage that has been caused jointly by several individuals - called tortfeasors - is a difficult problem that courts often face. Even if there are basic principles and rules to apportion damages among them, legal scholars are still looking for a systematic apportionment method. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610447
The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be a step towards furthering our understanding of matching market performance. We propose absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate problems with strict preferences. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550171
This paper introduces a core concept, called the γ-core, in the primitive framework of a strategic game. For a certain class of strategic games, it is a weaker concept than the strong Nash equilibrium, but in general stronger than the conventional α- and β- cores. We argue that the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550191
This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008294
We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this excrcise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008518
In this paper we examine a collective decision problem, where the set of heterogeneous individuals is partitioned into several groups, each choosing its own policy (e.g., location of a public project) from the given policy space. We first consider the notion of "efficient" partition that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008591
International agreements on transfrontier pollution issues require ap- proval by domestic political institutions. In this paper we employ a voting game theoretic model to characterize the stability of such agreements when each country’s participation is conditioned upon a domestic ratification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008629
We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2005). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution concept....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065432
This paper deals with the issue of how to allocate greenhouse gas emission permits to nations in the long run. The so-called "equitable" rules to allocate such permits under a global agreement (per capita or grandfathering allocation rules for instance) do not necessarily ensure stability in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042885