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SELF-ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS IN AN N-PLAYER DYNAMIC GAME
FERSHTMAN, C. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783625
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BEHAVIORALLY CONSISTENT OPTIMAL STOPPING RULES
KARNI, E.; SAFRA, Z. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783675
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THE NON-COMPETITIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY.
HELPMAN, E. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487321
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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF RISK AVERSION
KARNI, E.; SAFRA, Z. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647255
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SENSITIVITY OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS TO RISK AVERSIONS
SAFRA, Z.; ZILCHA, I. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675347
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TURNPIKE PROPERTIES IN A FINITE HORIZON DIFFERENTIAL GAME: DYNAMIC DUOPOLY WITH STICKY PRICES
FERSHTMAN, C.; KAMIEN, M.I. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675412
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The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who Maries Whom? and what Happens Upon Divorce?
Weiss, Y. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675413
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RISK AVERSION IN NASH BARGAINING PROBLEM WITH RISKY OUTCOMES AND RISKY DISAGREEMENT OUTCOME
SAFRA, Z.; ZILCHA, I. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675420
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BARGAINING SOLUTIONS WITHOUT THE EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS.
ZILCHA; I.; SAFRA, Z. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675433