We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner's curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The eect of the winner's curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller's expected...

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

In this paper we analyze the evolution of firm efficiency in the Czech Republic. Using a large panel of more than 190,000 Czech firm/years we study whether firms fully utilize their resources, how firm efficiency evolves over time, and how firm efficiency is determined by ownership structure. We...

We show that open ascending auctions are prone to inecient rushes, i.e. all bidders quitting at the same price, in market environments such as privatizations, takeover contests, and procurement auctions. Rushes arise when an incumbent with better information about a common value component of the...

We analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information that could be gathered...

Results of data envelopment analysis sensitively respond to stochastic noise in the data. In this paper, by introduction of output augmentation and input reduction I extend additive models for stochastic data envelopment analysis (SDEA), which were developed by Li (1998) to handle the noise in...