We study the effect of recognition on performance with a field experiment involving first-year undergraduate students … the second midterm grade is 0.03s (s = the grade's standard deviation) for the recipients of recognition, and 0.15s for … (itself unaffected), and decreases with the distance to the cutoff grade for recognition, reaching a significant 0.44s for …

We study the effect of recognition on performance with a field experiment involving first-year undergraduate students … the second midterm grade is 0.03s (s = the grade's standard deviation) for the recipients of recognition, and 0.15s for … (itself unaffected), and decreases with the distance to the cutoff grade for recognition, reaching a significant 0.44s for …

In order to analyze if heterogeneity in psychological traits affects individual performance in sequential tournaments …, we conducted a tennis field experiment. In the experiment, we also varied the payment schemes (individual, team … performance whereas a preference towards competition enhanced it. On average, we observe a second mover advantage. However …

performance of the unit that they are auditing. We vary incentives in the experiment from individual (piece rate) to competitive …This study examines experimentally how dishonest behavior in the form of misreporting others' performance depends on … the nature of provided incentives. We conduct a 'lab in the field' experiment with internal auditors during two large …

In order to analyze if heterogeneity in psychological traits affects individual performance in sequential tournaments …, we conducted a tennis field experiment. In the experiment, we also varied the payment schemes (individual, team … performance whereas a preference towards competition enhanced it. On average, we observe a second mover advantage. However …

performance of the unit that they are auditing. We vary incentives in the experiment from individual (piece rate) to competitive …This study examines experimentally how dishonest behavior in the form of misreporting others' performance depends on … the nature of provided incentives. We conduct a 'lab in the field' experiment with internal auditors during two large …

introducing lax monitoring does not improve performance, but increases tardiness substantially. Strict monitoring increases … tardiness to the same extent, but also leads to substantial improvements in performance. Theft, on the other hand, occurs more …

We study how different demographic groups respond to incentives by comparing their performance in "high" and "low … section of the GRE. We find that Males exhibit a larger drop in performance between the high and low stakes examinations than … females, and Whites exhibit a larger drop in performance compared to minorities. Differences between high and low stakes tests …

We study how different demographic groups respond to incentives by comparing their performance in “high” and “low … section of the GRE. We find that Males exhibit a larger drop in performance between the high and low stakes examinations than … females, and Whites exhibit a larger drop in performance compared to minorities. Differences between high and low stakes tests …