In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …

A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …

A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …

This paper reports the results from a large-scale laboratory experiment investigating the impact of tournament …

This paper reports the results from a large-scale laboratory experiment investigating the impact of tournament …

environments. To explore this further, we conducted a laboratory experiment comprising 444 subjects, and measured gender … differences in performance in four distinct competitive situations. These were as follows: (i) the standard tournament game where …