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game theory
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Fudenberg, D.
4
FUDENBERG, D.
3
LEVINE, D.K.
3
Smith, L.
3
Levine, D.K.
2
Abreu, D.
1
Dutta, P.K.
1
LOURY, G.
1
MASKIN, E.
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PALFREY, T.R.
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Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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1
Self-Confirming Equilibrium .
Fudenberg, D.
;
Levine, D.K.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005035399
Saved in:
2
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem.
Smith, L.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748894
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3
TACIT COLLUSION IN A DYNAMIC DUOPOLY WITH INDIVISIBLE PRODUCTION AND CUMULATIVE CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS.
LOURY, G.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748909
Saved in:
4
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests.
Schmidt, K.M.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749038
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5
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed.
Fudenberg, D.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574331
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6
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION.
FUDENBERG, D.
;
LEVINE, D.K.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574385
Saved in:
7
Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition.
Abreu, D.
;
Dutta, P.K.
;
Smith, L.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574408
Saved in:
8
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
FUDENBERG, D.
;
LEVINE, D.K.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574435
Saved in:
9
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
FUDENBERG, D.
;
LEVINE, D.K.
;
MASKIN, E.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005587329
Saved in:
10
TESTING GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF FREE RIDING: NEW EVIDENCE OD PROBABILITY BIAS AND LEARNING.
PALFREY, T.R.
;
ROSENTHAL, H.
-
Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of …
-
1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574255
Saved in:
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