The aim of this paper is to show the relation among equilibria in models with different levels of rationality. The different levels of rationality are defined in terms of the number of iterations that a player can perform with a simple rule for updating beliefs. It is shown that the rule...

A model of "satisficing" behavior in the repeated Prisoners Dilemma is studied. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. [S]he switches from the action played in the previous period only if the achieved payoff fell below the aspiration level (with a probability that...

In this paper, present a calibrated model of life-cycle occupation and investment decisions where households choose between paid work and entrepreneurship and conditional on the latter how much of their savings to invest in their business. The returns to entrepreneurial activity are modeled...

Equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game is investigated in a learning context with persistent randomness. I adopt a matching framework similar to Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and assume that individuals belong to populations of different sizes. Despite the myopic behavior of...

Here I provide a model that gives some insights regarding questions about actual economic behavior. I take as a source for stylized facts the experiments conducted by Marimón and Sunder as reported in Econometrica, 1993, in which it is shown that people initially do not behave according to the...

This paper proposes an aspiration-based model for (anonymous) cooperation where a large population of agents are re-matched every period to playa Prisoner's Dilemma. At each point in time, agents hold a certain common aspiration level which is updated on the basis of population-average...