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An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games

Funai, Naoki - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 648-669

In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions, where the assessment of each action is a weighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010711826

Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature

Weidenholzer, Simon - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 551-585

local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and … best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756384

Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting Model for Market Entry Games

Chen, Wei; Liu, Shu-Yu; Chen, Chih-Han; Lee, Yi-Shan - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 187-199

This paper describes the “Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting” (BI-SAW) model, which won the http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/Market Entry Prediction Competition in 2010. The BI-SAW model refines the I-SAW Model (Erev et al. [1]) by adding the assumption of limited memory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025196

Market Entry Prediction Competition 2010

Hariskos, Wasilios; Leder, Johannes; Teodorescu, Kinneret - In: Games 2 (2011) 2, pp. 200-208

We submitted three models to the competition which were based on the I-SAW model. The models introduced four new assumptions. In the first model an adjustment process was introduced through which the tendency for exploration was higher at the beginning and decreased over time in the exploration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025198

Learning in Networks—An Experimental Study Using Stationary Concepts

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Neumann, Thomas; Vogt, Bodo - In: Games 5 (2014) 3, pp. 140-159

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 …, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) which represent the long-run equilibrium of a learning process …. Secondly, we relate our results to four different learning models (impulse-matching learning, action-sampling learning, self …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030494

When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2013

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318837

Once beaten, never again : imitation in two-player potential games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2012

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569667