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Monitoring, Cross Subsidies, and Universal Banking
Choi, Jay Pil; Stefanadis, Christodoulos - 2015
loans. This practice has an adverse effect on commercial banks’ monitoring incentives, encouraging the pursuit of private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011388176
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011415298
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Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment
Johansson, Per; Lindahl, Erica - 2010
During the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms and social interactions for explaining sickness absence behavior. In this context public discussions about the intentions of the insurance, and of the rights and duties of the receivers, may be important for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273934
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Monitoring or moral hazard? Evidence from real activities manipulation by venture-backed companies.
Liu, Xiang - 2009
companies. The VC monitoring hypothesis argues that VCs effectively resolve the managerial agency problem through close … monitoring and restraining managers' earnings management behavior. The VC moral hazard hypothesis argues that VCs aggravate the … monitoring hypothesis that VCs restrain managers' RM behavior. Furthermore, I document that venture-backed companies exhibit a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009475038
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The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451195
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Arm-wrestling in the classroom: The non-monotonic effects of monitoring teachers
Lichand, Guilherme; Wolf, Sharon - 2020
Teacher absenteeism and shirking are common problems in developing countries. While monitoring teachers should … paper provides causal evidence that this might result from non-monotonic effects of monitoring teachers. Cross …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253773
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2017
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695410
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Should sickness insurance and health care be administrated by the same jurisdiction? An empirical analysis
Johansson, Per; Nilsson, Martin - 2012
doctor. Since health care is administrated at the county level, this means that monitoring is, to some extent, decentralized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321109
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Substitution between temporary parental leave and sickness absence
Persson, Malin - 2011
subject to intensified monitoring. Receiving this information decreased utilization of the temporary parental benefit but at …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321128
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531724