This paper analyzes the optimal choice of pricing schedules andtechnological deterrence levels in a market with digital piracy wheresellers can influence the degree of piracy by implementing digitalrights management (DRM) systems. It is shown that a monopolist’soptimal pricing schedule can be...

We develop and analyze a model of pricing for digital products withdiscontinuous supply functions. This characterizes a number ofinformation technology-based products and services for which variableincreases in demand are fulfilled by the addition of 'blocks' ofcomputing or network...

We develop and analyze a model of pricing for digital products with discontinuous supply functions. This characterizes a number of information technology-based products and services for which variable increases in demand are fulfilled by the addition of "blocks" of computing or network...

This paper presents a model of price screening for goods with network effects, by a monopoly seller, and by an entry-deterring monopolist. These products are used in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers, the magnitude of network effects is influenced by gross consumption, rather than...

This paper analyzes the optimal choice of pricing schedules and technological deterrence levels in a market with digital piracy, when legal sellers can sometimes control the extent of piracy by implementing digital rights management (DRM) systems. It is shown that the seller's optimal pricing...

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible, and administering usage-based pricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offering fixed- fee pricing in...