Many industries are made of a few big firms, which are able to manipulate the market outcome, and of a host of small businesses, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. We provide a general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness...

The literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics. This methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions, and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities....

We analyze a model of a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions. These two locations differ for the market size or for the distribution of the willingness to pay for quality of their consumers. Firms sequentially choose to settle in one region and then simultaneously compete in...

This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy, as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects...

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

In the spirit of Arrow (1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay for a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product...