We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn...

We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn...

This paper estimates the costs of participating to the stock market, together with the cross sectional dispersion of stock market optimism. Our analysis is based on a mean-variance framework, when there is a riskless asset (cash), which makes the allocation of the investment in risky assets...

Using Italian household data we jointly estimate the yearly cost of participating to the stock market and the cross sectional distribution of optimism about excess returns of stocks over bonds. Using mean-variance analysis we derive individual efficient portfolio allocation rules, as functions...

We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies (participate and bid the valuation iff it is greater than the cutoff), since if a bidder finds it optimal to...

We use household data to estimate the cost of participating to financial markets and the cross sectional dispersion of stock market optimism. Our analysis is based on a mean-variance framework, within which we derive structural decision rules for individual composition of the risky assets...

We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn...