criteria. A first result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) procurement … favoritism increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic implementation problems for a cartel of bidders … favoritism greatly simplifies matters for the cartel. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at a high cost …

criteria. A first result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) procurement … favoritism substantially facilitates collusion. It increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic …), favoritism only partially shades the cartel from the environment. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award … a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. …