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Multidimensional screening with complementary activities : regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Borges, Ana Pinto; Laussel, Didier; Correia-da-Silva, João - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 532-560
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240853
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Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: Regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Borges, Ana Pinto; Laussel, Didier; Correia-da-Silva, João - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 532-560
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369417
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Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building
Borges, Ana Pinto; Laussel, Didier; Correia-da-Silva, João - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 532-560
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030510
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Airport’s Abuse of Dominant Position on Aeronautical Charges in Europe: a case law approach
Brochado, Ana; Marrana, João - Centro de Investigação em Gestão e Economia (CIGE), … - 2011
The aim of this paper is to provide a European perspective of airports’ abuse of dominant position regarding airport charges. As airports have traditionally held a monopoly position in their respective geographical market, the EU member states have regulated the airport charges paid by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643249