If asking subjects their beliefs during repeated game play changes the way those subjects play, using those stated beliefs to evaluate and compare theories of strategic behavior is problematic. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a repeated asymmetric...

Sannikov (2007) investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2) needs some corrections. I show that the main theorem holds as it is with suitable modifications of Lemmata 5 and 6.

A key obstacle to coordination and cooperation in many networked environments is that behavior in each bilateral relationship is not observable to individuals outside that relationship: that is, information is local. This paper investigates when players can use communication to replicate any...

We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. To understand the dynamics, we extend a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. While this result delineates which payoffs can be...

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and...

We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer given a framework of bilateral moral hazard with variable but non-verifiable input quality. Given the inability of third parties to verify input quality, each party has an incentive to cheat the...

We consider a simplified model of finance market where two players carry on direct multistage bidding with risky assets (shares). One of the players (the insider) is informed on the liquidation price of a share, the other player knows its probability distribution only. It is shown that the...

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries over on repeated bargaining situations. He concludes that stationary equilibria for such a repeated bargaining game do not imply the Rubinstein solution and that several non-stationary equilibria may exist. This...