Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...

The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in...

This study analysed the contribution of economic growth and redistribution components to aggregate poverty changes in Ireland from 1987-2005, using the Shapley value decomposition approach. The analysis used the household disposable income data from the Household Budget Survey to calculate...

In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...

We study a one-period supply chain problem consisting of numerous suppliers delivering a homogenous good. Individual supply is uncertain and may exhibit dependencies with other suppliers as well as with the stochastic demand. Assuming that reliability of supply represents an economic value for...

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Purpose: This paper aims at defining the value creation mechanism and income distribution strategies of product-service integration in order to promote product-service integration of a firm. Design/methodology/approach: This paper conducts researches quantitatively on the coordination mechanism...