Showing 1 - 10 of 68
In [MP08] L. Marengo and C. Pasquali present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328378
We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328492
In this paper we develop on a geometric model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements (objects). Social choice can be seen as a process of search for optima in a complex multi-dimensional space and objects determine a decomposition of such a space into subspaces. We present a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328500
Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the contrary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328578
We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328589
Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332253
In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335990
It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559996
Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible there is, strictly speaking, no social choice individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267062
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters of a society belong to this set, their majority relation has no cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, every such domain can be assumed to be closed in the sense that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011499880