A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Hatsumi, Kantaro ; Berga, Dolors ; Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	Medianwähler-Modell \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Theorie \| social choice \| public decision making \| voting by committees \| generalized median voter scheme \| separable preference

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 809
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	657012270 [GVK] hdl:10419/92627 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332253