This paper analyses a transboundary pollution problem between two countries and studies the efficiency comparison of uniform versus differentiated abatement standards when there are imperfect transfers between countries. To achieve this goal, we use a negotiation game and the Nash bargaining...

This note proposes an example which contradicts the idea that similar countries will negotiate an agreement on a uniform standard. It shows that strictly identical countries may have an interest in reducing their emissions differently, and not in a uniform way. This result relies on the...

This paper analyses a transboundary pollution problem between two countries and studies the efficiency comparison of uniform versus differentiated abatement standards when there are imperfect transferts between countries. To achieve this goal, we use a negotiation game and the Nash bargaining...

This note proposes an example which contradicts the idea that similar countries will negotiate an agreement on a uniform standard. It shows that strictly identical countries may have an interest in reducing their emissions differently, and not in a uniform way. This result relies on the...

We investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are...

Most of the international environmental agreements that have been signed in the past to resolve transboundary pollution problems appear constrained in the sense that either monetary transfers accompany uniform abatement standards (agreements based on a uniform standard with monetary transfers),...

We investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are...

This paper studies the link between the design of international environmental agreements and the incentives for the private sector to invest in cleaner technologies. More specifically, it compares the performance, in the Paretoo sense, of two types of agreement : an agreement on a uniform...

This paper studies the link between the design of international environmental agreements and the incentives for the private sector to invest in cleaner technologies. More specifically, it compares the performance, in the Paretoo sense, of two types of agreement : an agreement on a uniform...