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On the Extent of Strategic Voting
Spenkuch, Jörg - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
-world elections. The evidence indicates that approximately 35% of voters abandon their most preferred candidate if she is not in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109723
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Civic norms, social sanctions and voting turnout
Knack, Stephen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1992
This study views voter participation as a collective action problem overcome chiefly by means of "solidary" and "purposive" selective incentives. It is argued that these incentives are primarily in the form of civic or societal norms, rather than special interest norms associated with partisan...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788784
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Russian Election Reform and the Effect of Social Conformity on Voting and the Party System: 2007 and 2008
Coleman, Stephen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
conformity exerted a strong, persistent, and predictable influence on voting in national elections from 1991 to 2003. This … analysis examines how the effect of social conformity on Russian voters might have changed from earlier elections as a result … aligns with the interests of voters, and whether this type of analysis can speak to fairness of the elections. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005787119
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Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael; Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1998
elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is sufficient for admission, and voters can support as many candidates as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118533
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Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision
Staal, Klaas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
In this paper I examine the incentives of regions to unite, to separate and to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. When public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835220
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How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835685
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National Interference in Local Public Good Provision
Dur, Robert; Staal, Klaas - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003
We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions, each comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighbouring district,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256509
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Please don’t vote for me: strategic voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives
Spenkuch, Jörg L. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
, this paper documents patterns of strategic voting in a large, real world election. During the 2005 elections to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260101
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Enfranchisement and Representation: Italy 1909-1913
Larcinese, Valentino - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics … - 2011
. The paper documents elite's effort to minimize the political impact of the reform. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368612
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Voting by Committees under Constraints
Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2001
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124