This paper analyzes the problem faced by a risk-averse firm considering how much to invest in a risky project. The firm receives a signal about the value of the project. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the signal distribution such that (i) the agent's investment is nondecreasing...

We study how stock price informativeness changes with the presence of highfrequency trading (HFT). Our estimate is based on the staggered start of HFT participation in a panel of international exchanges. With HFT presence market prices are a less reliable predictor of future cash ows and...

Using the introduction of high-speed rail as exogenous shocks to costs of information acquisition, we show that reductions in information-acquisition costs lead to a significant increase in information production and improvement in output quality, evidenced by higher frequency of analysts...

We consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations. Private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price. We study the learning externalities that arise in this setting, and in particular their implications for price...

Using the introduction of high-speed rail (HSR) as an exogenous shock to costs of information acquisition, we show that reductions in information-acquisition costs lead to (i) a significant increase in information production, evidenced by a higher frequency of analysts visiting portfolio firms,...

We study how the informativeness of stock prices changes with the presence of high-frequency trading (HFT). Our estimate is based on the staggered start of HFT participation in a panel of international exchanges. With HFT presence, market prices are a less reliable predictor of future cash flows...

We study a pricing and information provisioning game between a better informed seller (such as a retailer) and its customers. The seller is (ex-post) better informed about product availability and can choose how to communicate this information to the customers. Using a Bayesian persuasion...