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We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082
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For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium when private monitoring is "close" to some public monitoring. Private monitoring is "close" to public monitoring if the private signals can generate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109614
This paper studies competing mechanisms with limited commitment over infinite horizon. Between a mechanism and the agent, there is perfect monitoring, but each mechanism can have arbitrary signals about the interaction between other mechanisms and the agent. I show that if the agent's type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587523
This paper studies competing mechanisms with limited commitment over infinite horizon. Between a mechanism and the agent, there is perfect monitoring, but each mechanism can have arbitrary signals about the interaction between other mechanisms and the agent. I show that if the agent’s type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011615835
We study the repeated two-player Prisoners' Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and no communication. Letting the discount factor go to one and holding the monitoring structure fixed, we achieve asymptotic efficiency. Unlike previous works on private monitoring, which have confined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538004
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This paper analyzes repeated games in which it is possible for players to observe the other players' past actions without noise but it is costly. One's observation decision itself is not observable to the other players, and this private nature of monitoring activity makes it difficult to give...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005422893
Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other motorists. In most countries such liability must be insured by law. That law may favor expensive or heavy vehicles, prone to suffer or inflict large losses. This paper explores links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333956
Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352862