We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are N types of bidders whose valuations are … decrease. Finally, we give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will …

The authors analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are N types of bidders whose …; hence, the auction will be efficient. …

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are …

auction bidders. Our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the (exogenous) probability that bidders … participate in a resale market after the auction. In all treatments, the possibility of resale increases efficiency after the … auction, but it also induces demand reduction by high-value bidders during the auction, which reduces auction efficiency. In …

auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly …

optimal auction, the first price auction and the second price auction. …

auction formats that make bidding difficult and risky in different ways. We find that measures of `difficulty' provide a …

former favor the weak buyer. However, we show that the seller can do one better by augmenting the first-price auction by a … pre-auction offer made exclusively to the strong buyer. Should the strong buyer reject the offer, the object is simply … sold in an ordinary first-price auction. The result is driven by the fact that the unmodified first-price auction is too …