This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for distributions of bidders' values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data pertain to the winner's identity and the transaction...

The paper reports on the effects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to...

Using an example we show that the Revenue Equivalence in the Scoring Auctions, as postulated by Che (1993), no longer holds when the suppliers are asymmetric in their costs of production.

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.