We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players to truthfully reveal their values as a dominant strategy. The...

I consider a situation wherein a research lab has developed a process innovation and wants to sell licenses to members of an industry. The literature has mostly considered the sale of exclusive licenses. I demonstrate, using both theoretical and experimental methods, that when firms sell...

The following is an outline of the four chapters of this dissertation. Chapter 1 shows that subgame perfect equilibrium and weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium require rationality at information sets that are irrelevant for determining whether outcomes are sustained by sequentially rational play....

This thesis examines the strategic incentives of market players under constrained situations that generate economic externalities. The first chapter considers a model of competition in which economic activity takes place through networks of bilateral interactions. Economic externalities in this...