Similar Search Results

Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - In: American Economic Review 111 (2021) 4, pp. 1055-1091

We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013502140

Consciously uncertain: A Bayesian analysis of preferences formation

Stimolo, Marco; Beraldo, Sergio; Capasso, Salvatore; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-20

We investigate experimentally whether players deliberately use irrelevant market cues to shape their evaluations of a traded item. We implement a repeated Vickrey median price selling auction of an unusual bad where players are informed on the market price and on the three lowest or highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200171

Do REITs outperform stocks and fixed-income assets? New evidence from mean-variance and stochastic dominance approaches

Chiang, Thomas C.; Lean, Hooi Hooi; Wong, Wing-keung - In: Journal of Risk and Financial Management 1 (2008) 1, pp. 1-40

This paper re-examines the performance of REITs, stocks, and fixed-income assets based on the preferences of risk …-averse and risk-seeking investors using mean-variance and stochastic dominance approaches. Our findings indicate no first … order to maximize their expected utility, the risk-averse prefer fixed-income assets over real estate, which, in turn, is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011843211

Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: An experimental investigation

Otamendi, F. Javier; Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D. - In: Games 9 (2018) 1, pp. 1-31

equilibrium than others. Since deviations take mostly the form of overbidding, these subjects win the first or second good and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852731

Differenzverträge fördern den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien und mindern Strompreisrisiken

Kröger, Mats; Neuhoff, Karsten; Richstein, Jörn C. - In: DIW Wochenbericht 89 (2022) 35, pp. 439-447

Die Bundesregierung hat im Juli 2022 das sogenannte 'Osterpaket' verabschiedet, das eine Vielzahl an Maßnahmen zum Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien vorsieht. Das Paket hält an der gleitenden Marktprämie als Vergütungsmechanismus fest, welche einseitig nur StromerzeugerInnen absichert, während...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013371397

Contracts for difference support the expansion of renewable energy sources while reducing electricity price risks

Kröger, Mats; Neuhoff, Karsten; Richstein, Jörn C. - In: DIW Weekly Report 12 (2022) 35/36, pp. 205-213

The German Federal Government passed the "Easter Package" in July 2022, which envisages a number of measures for the expansion of renewable energy sources. The package retains sliding market premiums as a remuneration mechanism, which protect electricity producers unilaterally, while contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013371404

Gebotskostenförderung in Windenergie-Auktionen

Wauer, Niels; Lehmann, Paul; Maurer, Christoph - In: Wirtschaftsdienst 103 (2023) 2, pp. 112-117

Deutschland steht vor der Herausforderung sich zügig aus der Abhängigkeit der fossilen Energien zu lösen. Dazu ist ein umfassender Umbau des Energiesystems notwendig. Die Windenergie an Land gehört zu den wichtigsten Erzeugungsquellen, die in großem Maßstab entwickelt werden müssen, um...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014289962

Reconciliaciones y estrategias de oferta en el mercado mayorista de electricidad de Colombia

Carabalí, Jaime; Pérez, Alex; Meneses Cerón, Luis Ángel - In: Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y … 35 (2023), pp. 57-79

In this paper, we study the relationship between reconciliations in the Colombian electricity market and the bid prices by firms on the spot market. In this work,we propose a model of behavior of the firm to elaborate theoretical predictions about the relationship between the reconciliations and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014494436

Obviousness around the clock

Breitmoser, Yves; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian - In: Experimental Economics 25 (2021) 2, pp. 483-513

Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501391

When Walras meets Vickrey

Delacrétaz, David; Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1803-1845

We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536857