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Consciously uncertain: A Bayesian analysis of preferences formation

Stimolo, Marco; Beraldo, Sergio; Capasso, Salvatore; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-20

We investigate experimentally whether players deliberately use irrelevant market cues to shape their evaluations of a traded item. We implement a repeated Vickrey median price selling auction of an unusual bad where players are informed on the market price and on the three lowest or highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200171

Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - In: American Economic Review 111 (2021) 4, pp. 1055-1091

We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013502140

Do REITs outperform stocks and fixed-income assets? New evidence from mean-variance and stochastic dominance approaches

Chiang, Thomas C.; Lean, Hooi Hooi; Wong, Wing-keung - In: Journal of Risk and Financial Management 1 (2008) 1, pp. 1-40

This paper re-examines the performance of REITs, stocks, and fixed-income assets based on the preferences of risk …-averse and risk-seeking investors using mean-variance and stochastic dominance approaches. Our findings indicate no first … order to maximize their expected utility, the risk-averse prefer fixed-income assets over real estate, which, in turn, is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011843211

Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: An experimental investigation

Otamendi, F. Javier; Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D. - In: Games 9 (2018) 1, pp. 1-31

equilibrium than others. Since deviations take mostly the form of overbidding, these subjects win the first or second good and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852731

Kurzfristige Auktionen erhöhen Handelsvolumen und Marktliquidität an der Strombörse

Neuhoff, Karsten; Ritter, Nolan - In: DIW Wochenbericht 83 (2016) 41, pp. 987-993

Die Anteile fluktuierender erneuerbarer Stromerzeugung aus Windkraft- und Photovoltaikanlagen steigen in Deutschland und Europa. Ein effizienterer Handel dieser erneuerbarer Energien erfordert flexible Strommärkte. Hierbei können Auktionen einen effizienteren Handel ermöglichen, unter anderem...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011546822

Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 95-118

expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking … extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599366

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Bikhchandani, Sushil - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 369-393

We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599375

Optimal auctions with ambiguity

Bose, Subir; Ozdenoren, Emre; Pape, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 4, pp. 411-438

A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599377

A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

Olszewski, Wojciech; Chung, Kim-Sau - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487

We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599395

Auction design in the presence of collusion

Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429

We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in such a situation are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599408

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