This paper provides an explanation for the empirically proven relationship between overtime and future benefits. We suggest an internal signaling model, in which a worker signals his value to the employer by supplying unpaid overtime. In our empirical analysis, we examine whether overtime has in...

Although the standard work week is longer in East than in West Germany, there is a higher incidence and average amount of unpaid overtime worked in the new states. We try to explain the striking differences in unpaid overtime by analyzing the labor supply side. We focus on the investment...

The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of a non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with unobservable effort and incentive ("fair") wages a la Danthine and Kurmann (2004), and explicitly perform the aggregation presented there without a formal proof, and thus provide -...

The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with reciprocity in labor relations ("gift exchange") a la Danthine and Kurmann (2010), and explicitly perform the aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide...

The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market...

In den Tarifverhandlungen der Metall- und Elektroindustrie forderte die Arbeitgeberseite eine Ausweitung der Tageshöchstarbeitszeit und die Arbeitnehmerseite eine flexible Arbeitszeitverkürzung mit partiellem Lohnausglei ch. Allerdings deuten die Arbeitsmarktdaten darauf hin, dass eine...

The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with imperfect observability of work effort, and the need to use efficiency wages to prevent shirking as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In addition, the paper and explicitly performs the...

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...

With the goal of maximizing expected gains from trade, this paper analyzes the jointly optimal information structure and mechanism in a bilateral trade setting. The difference in gains from trade between the optimal information structure and first best constitutes the minimal loss due to...

We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty....