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Kurzfristige Auktionen erhöhen Handelsvolumen und Marktliquidität an der Strombörse

Neuhoff, Karsten; Ritter, Nolan - In: DIW Wochenbericht 83 (2016) 41, pp. 987-993

this background, the European Power Exchange (EPEX)launched a new day-ahead auction for 15-minute products in December 2014 … presents the results of a causal analysis that indicates that the introduction of the new auction has increased trading volumes … and market liquidity. This increase in trading volume is an indicator that the auction provides benefits and potential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011546822

Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 95-118

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599366

Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

Bikhchandani, Sushil - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 369-393

-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599375

Optimal auctions with ambiguity

Bose, Subir; Ozdenoren, Emre; Pape, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 4, pp. 411-438

A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a … unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of … the bidders face more ambiguity than the seller we show that (i) given any auction, the seller can always (weakly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599377

A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

Olszewski, Wojciech; Chung, Kim-Sau - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487

We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599395

Auction design in the presence of collusion

Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429

We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way … they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599408

Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence

Virág, Gábor - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 2, pp. 241-274

The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices freely. An important outstanding conjecture (e.g. Peters and Severinov (1997)) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599429

A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)

Segal, Ilya R.; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 1, pp. 109-125

We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599440

Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem

Moldovanu, Benny; Dizdar, Deniz; Gershkov, Alex - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 157-184

We analyze maximization of revenue in the dynamic and stochastic knapsack problem where a given capacity needs to be allocated by a given deadline to sequentially arriving agents. Each agent is described by a two-dimensional type that reflects his capacity requirement and his willingness to pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599442

First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now-prices with Allais paradox bidders

Nakajima, Daisuke - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 3, pp. 473-498

with such preferences. We show that the Dutch auction systematically yields a higher revenue than the first-price auction … in the expected utility case. We also show that introducing a "buy-it-now-price" to the first-price auction increases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599452

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