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politicians and experts in organizations. for politicians and experts in organizations. …
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Market concentration often leads to unnecessarily high prices and reduced innovation. European merger control positively affects competition and productivity, though not yet perfectly effectively. In times of increased market concentration, merger control needs to be enforced even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012007682
Kann eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung Effizienzziele verfolgen? Diese Frage beantwortet der Autor mit einem deutlichen "Nein!". Ob eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung vorliegt, eine marktbeherrschende Stellung missbraucht wird oder der Wettbewerb im Gemeinsamen Markt im Sinne der...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451116
Marktkonzentration kann oft zu unnötig hohen Preisen und niedriger Innovation führen. Eine effiziente europäische Fusionskontrolle hat positive Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb und die Produktivität. In Zeiten von gestiegener Marktkonzentration muss die Fusionskontrolle gerade in digitalen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016046
This paper analyses the profitability of horizontal mergers in a Stackelberg model and their impact on welfare when there is uncertainty about the marginal costs of the newly merged firms. The authors consider that the merging firms decide their production strategy knowing the actual value of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362519
Merger control plays a central role in competition policy. When assessing proposed mergers, Competition Authorities should consider its impact on all relevant markets. Large mergers between manufacturers typically impact competition, thus requiring the approval of Competition Authorities....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014563099
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This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704848
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079