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Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 234 (2014) 3, pp. 774-779
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360421
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Budget feasible procurement auctions
Anari, Nima; Goel, Gagan; Nikzad, Afshin - In: Operations research 66 (2018) 3, pp. 637-652
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011884264
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Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
Burkett, Justin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 133-155
budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The results link the observed use of budget constraints to their use in models … incorporating budget-constrained bidders. Other implications of the model are that a general revenue equivalence result applies and … that the optimal auction with budget-constrained bidders has a standard solution analogous to the one for classic models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673069
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A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - In: Research policy : policy, management and economic … 43 (2014) 1, pp. 179-189
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405146
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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194
A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents …' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented … over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low‐budget agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806402
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Payoff implications of incentive contracting
Garrett, Daniel F. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1281-1312
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806477
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Auction design in the presence of collusion
Pavlov, Gregory - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 383-429
We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in such a situation are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700241
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A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
Chung, Kim-sau; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487
We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702275
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888