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Sequential persuasion
Li, Fei; Norman, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 639-675
This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587427
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Costly miscalibration
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 477-506
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295
) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
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Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap‐talk games
Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487
We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751
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Hierarchical cheap talk
Ambrus, Attila; Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Kamada, Yuichiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 233-261
example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686974
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Optimal information disclosure : a linear programming approach
Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702
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Communication with multiple senders : an experiment
Vespa, Emanuel; Wilson, Alistair J. - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-36
We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011798907
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When does communication improve coordination?
Ellingsen, Tore; Östling, Robert - In: The American economic review 100 (2010) 4, pp. 1695-1724
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747574
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Relational communication
Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1391-1430
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806596
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Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication
Bayindir, Esra E.; Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca; … - In: Games 11 (2020) 2/18, pp. 1-22
This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission … having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first, sequential in the second and … one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. However, as to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431852