We consider a market with two symmetric firms and two asymmetric consumer groups. Firms send advertising messages which inform consumers about the existence and the price of their product (Butters, 1977). Targeting a specific consumer is imperfect as with some probability the consumer is not...

Price discrimination is an extensively studied subject in monopoly behavior. Increasing profits, covering fixed cost and reducing distortions are reasons to sell a homogenous good at different prices. Price discrimination is however present also in oligopolistic markets. This paper is going to...

Constantly rising expenditures for pharmaceuticals and uninformed consumers require government intervention in firms’ pricing strategies. To this end, reference pricing systems are frequently employed as regulatory mechanisms. This paper considers a duopoly market with vertically...

The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the...

This note shows that in a large class of El Farol models the failure of agents to find rational prediction rules which stabilize is not due to a non-existence of perfect rules, but rather to the failure of agents to identify the correct class of predictors from which the perfect ones can be...

We study whether the number of signatures collected to qualify a popular initiative affects the probability of reforming the status quo. The initiative process is modeled as a sequential game under uncertainty: petitioners make an entry decision and collect signatures to qualify the initiative....

In classic game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices as strategies and study the consequences for the basic results of normal form games....

This paper presents a class of finite n x n bimatrix (2-player) games we coin Circulant Games. In Circulant Games, each player's payoff matrix is a circulant matrix, i.e.\ each row vector is rotated one element relative to the preceding row vector. We show that when the payoffs in the first row...

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the "right" payoff ordering....