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Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001835606
We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002626552
Do large language models (LLMs) - such as ChatGPT 3.5, ChatGPT 4.0, and Google's Gemini 1.0 Pro - simulate human behavior in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game with varying stake sizes? This paper investigates this question, examining how LLMs navigate scenarios where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015157997
If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long–term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long–term employment can result either from offering long–term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003906133
Within-subject data from sequential social dilemma experiments reveal a correlation of first-and second-mover decisions for which two channels may be responsible, that our experiment allows to separate: i) a direct, preference-based channel that influences both first- and second-mover decisions;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003925564
In this paper we treat instructions as an experimental variable. Using a public good game, we study how the instructions' format affects the participants' understanding of the experiment, their speed of play and their experimental behavior. We show that longer instructions do not significantly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009349750
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009306849
If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty à la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009509223
We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198494
We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payo , it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789435