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coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river …We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …
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In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
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This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483270
The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the...
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