This study attempted to analyze the effect of regulation and political stability in allocation of mobile telecommunication investments in the African continent between year 2001 and 2011. In order to better understand the dynamics of investment in telecommunications, a framework was developed to...

Given various recent antitrust investigations on the retail sector, we deal with uncovering demand systems substitution patterns for a particular market (diapers) to investigate the inter-format competition (supermarkets vs. discounters vs. drugstores). Using the uncovered demand system we...

On May 11-12, 2011, SUERF, the Belgian Financial Forum, the Brussels Finance Institute and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) jointly organised the 29th SUERF Colloquium New paradigms in money and finance? The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the...

We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast...

Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...

Using non-cooperative game theory the effects of mediation on the divorce rate and on the utility of the spouses are analysed. Two kinds of mediation are considered: restricted mediation that reduces the costs of divorce and extended mediation that additionally may prevent divorces by...

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only...