We consider a shared ownership arrangement among consumers/owners as a means to organize production with an underlying decreasing average cost function typical of natural monopolies. The resulting output allocation yields a lower deadweight loss than the monopoly allocation, and is, in some...

Suppose that (X,A) is a measurable space and Y is a metrizable, Souslin space. Let Au denote the universal completion of A. Given f : X x Y !R and x 2 X, let f (x,xc) be the lower semicontinuous hull of f (x,xc). If f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable, then f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable.

We obtain conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game with infinitely many types and/or strategies that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The main existence results are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions.

The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact...

We propose a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to nonlinear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional. Second, the Nash set can be...

The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976), according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes - in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income - ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result...

We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategies. We illustrate that, in continuous supermodular games, perfect equilibria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in...

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.