Showing 1 - 10 of 312
We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538847
We characterize how informed investors trade in the options market ahead of corporate news when they receive private, but noisy, information about (i) the timing of the announcement and (ii) its impact on stock prices. Our theoretical framework generates a rich set of predictions about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011541417
Dieser Beitrag liefert für die aktuelle wissenschaftliche und politische Regulierungsde-batte der Kapitalmärkte drei Argumente: (1) Der Beitrag präsentiert zuerst einen konzep-tionellen Ansatz, der zwischen sozial erwünschten und sozial schädlichen Folgen des In-siderhandels differenziert....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757277
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011606952
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011575596
The weekly release of the U.S. inventory level by the DOE-EIA is known as the market mover in the U.S. oil futures market and to be a significant piece of information for all world oil markets in which the WTI is a price benchmark. We uncover suspicious trading patterns in the WTI futures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591602
We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a generalised one-period Kyle (1985) model where insider trades can be subject to a size-dependent penalty. The result is obtained by considering uniform noise and holds for virtually any penalty function. Uniqueness is among all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012177212
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012178138
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011760841
The fixing of the Libor and Euribor benchmark rates has proven vulnerable to manipulation. Individual rate-setters may have incentives to fraudulently distort their submissions. For the contributing banks to collectively agree on the direction in which to rig the rate, however, their interests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011780773