In this paper, we use data from a corruption survey conducted among top politicians and high level civil servants in 290 Swedish municipalities in 2007 to investigate the effects of government size on corruption. We construct several measures of corruption based on the survey, and combine these...

International organizations have encouraged national governments to switch from traditional cash-based to business-like accrual accounting, on the presumption that long-run benefits may outweigh substantial implementation and operating costs. We use a quasi-experimental setting to evaluate...

The challenge of public administration reform is well-known: politicians often have little interest in the efficient implementation of government policy. Using new data from 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, we demonstrate that such reforms are significantly less likely...

Potential economic benefits of integrity and anti-corruption policies seem large. Nevertheless, much of the existing empirical evidence lacks precise and actionable policy indicators that could guide policy makers on tangible improvements of successful reforms. To move the policy analysis...

Without much preparation, Indonesia, in 2000, at a stroke replaced the previous system of centralized government and development planning with a wide range of decentralization programs. The reforms gave greater authority, political power, and financial resources directly to regencies and...

Corruption is the great disease of government. It undermines the efficiency of the public sector in many countries around the world. We experimentally study civic engagement (CE) as a constraint on corruption when incentives are stacked against providing CE. We show that CE is powerful in...

Recent research has highlighted social image and identity concerns as factors that influence economic decisions. Given that an individual’s choice of employment may be important for their social image, we consider a model of worker sorting into the mission-oriented or private sector with...

State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the...

This paper studies the wage differentials between the public and private sectors in Spain, as well as its distribution across different educational levels and by gender. To do so, the well-known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of mincerian wage regressions is applied for both sectors, breaking down...

The present work aims to explore the existing theories about the size of the public sector and test empirically in Brazilian municipalities. The theoretical model assumes that the economy has only two sectors: the public and the private. The latter receives productivity shocks while the former...