This paper studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known. I consider a principal-agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option. I show that if the principal has the...

We consider a relational contracting model in which the parties choose to allocate authority either to the principal (centralization) or to the agent (delegation). The party who has authority chooses a project, and the agent exerts effort to successfully execute the project. Delegation generates...

We investigate job design problems in relational contracting environments with multitasking and an aggregated and distorted performance measurement. Compared to assigning all the tasks to a single agent, assigning the tasks to multiple agents mitigates misallocation of effort among the tasks but...

This paper studies how reduced oversight creates an incentive for process innovation. With incomplete contracts, tight monitoring of workers creates a ratchet effect of innovation. Under reduced oversight, a worker accrues private knowledge about his innovation, which serves as a substitute for...

In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the...

We identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up problem' which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a 'contractual solution' to this hold-up problem is not available....