I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a … large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework …. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures: they are …

interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship between the voting share … estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups. Our approach also …

interest group's campaign contributions to politicians. We uncover a robust hump-shaped relationship between the voting share … estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups. Our approach also …

campaign contributions to ideologically neutral politicians who are often pivotal voters in the legislature. However, if … politicians who share similar policy preferences to win the election. Thus, liberal (conservative) interest groups will make … campaign contributions to liberal (conservative, respectively) politicians. In this paper, I first develop a model …