We study optimal pricing rules for a public large-value payment system (LVPS) that produces a public good (like prevention of systemic risk) but faces competition by a private LVPS for the private provision of large value payments. We show that the marginal cost of the public LVPS has to be...

Leisure is not a typical theme of analysis in Post Keynesian economics. The analysis of leisure, however, provides an opportunity to critique mainstream economic analysis as well as contributes toward our understanding of an important facet of modern economies. This paper provides an empirical...

This paper is a first step toward closing the analytical gap in the extensive literature on the results of interactions between public and private R&D expenditures, and their joint effects on the economy. A survey focusing on econometric studies in this area reveals a plethora of sometimes...

This Handbook entry presents a conceptual, normative overview of the subject of taxation. It emphasizes the relationships among the main functions of taxation--notably, raising revenue, redistributing income, and correcting externalities--and the mapping between these functions and various forms...

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We use the model to illustrate the special assumptions embedded...

We designed an experiment on voluntary contribution to a public good with interior solution. The treatment variable is the equilibrium level of contribution. We observe that the verage overcontribution rate (cooperation) is affected by the equilibrium level of contribution. Overcontribution is...

We show that experimental subjects tend to contribute more to the public good if they perceive the actions of the others as a source of positive externality rather than a source of negative externality. In our experiment partial contribution to the public good is the unique subgame perfect...

Inefficiencies in the bureaucratic organization of the state are often viewed as important factors in retarding economic development. Why certain societies choose or end up with such inefficient organizations has received very little attention, however. In this paper, we present a simple theory...

This paper assesses the extent and policy implications of simultaneous competition among countries on both corporate tax rates and the provision of public goods used by firms as production factors (‘public factors’). First, we derive the relevant theoretical results in a unified framework...

We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...