What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments? Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus....

We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyncratic play is intentional instead of random. In contract games, the stochastically stable state selected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the Nash bargain, rather than the usual Kalai-Smorodinsky...

The recent era of economic turbulence has generated a growing enthusiasm for an increase in new and original economic insights based around the concepts of reciprocity and social enterprise. This stimulating and thought-provoking Handbook not only encourages and supports this growth, but also...

Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution presents a set of original contributions to the much-debated issues of long-run economic growth in relation to institutional and social progress.

This volume presents a collection of essays honoring Professor Thomas E. Weisskopf, one of the most prominent contributors to the field of radical economics. Beginning his academic career at Harvard before moving to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, Professor Weisskopf has spent the past...

We explain the substantial decline in work hours over the 20th century by the joint influence of the employees’ “pecuniary emulation” of the “conspicuous consumption” of top income earners and the balance of political power of employers and employees in the presence of conflicts of...

Contributors to this volume argue that to understand capitalism in evolution, this diversity of systems and approaches must be taken into account and their individual evolutions analysed. This book represents a major understanding of the evolution of capitalism in the twenty first century and...

In both experimental and natural settings, incentives sometimes underperform, generating smaller effects on the targeted behaviors than would be predicted for entirely self-regarding agents. A parsimonious explanation is that incentives that appeal to self-regarding economic motives may crowd...