We investigate the impact of regulation on shareholder rights and corporate governance. We gauge the strength of shareholder rights by measuring the number of restrictive governance provisions that suppress shareholder rights, the more restrictive the governance, the weaker the shareholder...

There are two conflicting hypotheses regarding the effect of dual-class recapitalizations. One holds that the shareholders with voting rights improve the position of all shareholders because of their ability to negotiate a better takeover price. The other contends that the recapitalization can...

We test whether the conversion price (ratio) is viewed by the stock market as a credible signal of the firm's future earnings prospects (Kim (1990)) and, subsequently, whether convertible debt serves as backdoor equity financing (Stein (1992)). Examining the conversion price in relation to...

Previous studies show that co-managers mainly affect initial public offering (IPO) aftermarket activities. We investigate the role of co-managers in IPO pre-market activities. We argue that co-managers help reduce IPO placement risk and hypothesize that IPO issuers hire more co-managers when...

Recent financial economics literature has hypothesized that variations in market structure influence the distribution of gains from corporate restructuring between buyers and sellers. We test this hypothesis using data on restructuring involving real estate assets by isolating the effects...

"Whether firms pursue shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare is a controversial issue whose outcomes seem irreconcilable. We propose that firms are likely to compensate their executives for pursuing the firm's goal be it shareholder value maximization or the...

We examine the board structure of firms following stock-for-stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre-merger target board. The relative size of...

We examine the effects of busy directors on merger premiums and conclude that busy directors are not uniformly detrimental. We provide evidence that busy CEOs of acquirer firms are associated with lower premiums suggesting they do not shirk their responsibilities. Busy CEOs of target firms...