Motivated by increasing supporter involvement in club governance in English football, the paper presents a simple model of a sports league in which club objectives are utility functions defined over profits, win percentages and fan (=supporter) welfare, formalising a seminal suggestion of Sloane...

The paper shows that, with any rationing mechanism between the efficient and proportional extremes, the Kreps-Scheinkman two-stage quantity-price game reduces to the Cournot model if demand is uniformly elastic and if all costs are sunk at the first stage, thus providing positive results to set...

In a complete information auction, two integrated broadcasters bid for exclusive TV-rights to a sports league (e.g. the English Premier League), with two potential externalities: receipts feed through to the two league clubs who choose player expenditures, possibly enhancing league quality and...

This paper presents a theoretical model to show how distributional concerns can engender social conflict. We have a two‐period model that highlights the crucial role of future inequality. Equality of assets and income in the current period does not stop conflict from arising the anticipated...

We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns...

Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed' the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are...