We examine if the folk theorem of perfect competition holds under Bertrand competition (when firms supply all demand), both when entry is exogenous, as well as when it is free. Inter alia, we also characterize the limit equilibrium sets.

This paper explores the relationship between financial intermediation and employment. We explain why some economies have low financial intermediation even when financial intermediation is safe. Moreover, we seek to explain why these economies tend to be poor and vulnerable, and also have large...

In this paper we build a theory of joint venture formation and instability based on synergy and monitoring. We find that monitoring problems may prevent the joint venture from forming at all. Moreover, joint venture formation usually involves over-monitoring, and ex post could involve cheating...

We develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counterterrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the material cost of fatality,...

This paper examines public-private partnerships in micro-finance, whereby NGOs can help in channelizing credit to the poor, both in borrower selection, as well as in project implementation. We argue that a distortion may arise out of the fact that the private partner, i.e. the NGO, is a...

This paper examines public-private partnerships in micro-finance, whereby NGOs can help in channelizing credit to the poor, both in borrower selection, as well as in project implementation. We argue that a distortion may arise out of the fact that the private partner, i.e. the NGO, is a...

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price...