Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits

In this theoretical analysis, the"principal"can be the head of the tax collection agency (or"government"or even citizens), the"supervisor"can be the tax collector, and the"agent"can be the taxpayer. The principal, interested in controlling an agent's socially costly activity ("cheating"), hires...

This paper addresses the question of how the principal's surplus and agency costs depend on the agent's wealth. Our main results are: If the agent has an additively separable utility function in income and effort and his degree of absolute prudence is smaller than three times the agent's degree...

This paper addresses the question of how the principal's surplus and agency costs depend on the agent's wealth. Using the first-order approach, we identify properties of the agent's utility function which are sufficient conditions to guarantee that richer agents induce a lower expected surplus...