We study the relationship between a player's (stage game) minmax payoff and the individually rational payoff in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under a full rank assumption, we further...

In models of non-deterministic contest, players exert irreversible effort in order to increase their probability of winning a prize. The most prominent functional form of the win probability in the literature is the so-called logit" contest success function. We provide a simple micro-foundation...

This paper proposes a model of decision under ambiguity deemed vector expected utility, or VEU. In this model, an uncertain prospect, or Savage act, is assessed according to (a) a baseline expected-utility evaluation, and (b) an adjustment that reflects the individual's perception of ambiguity...

We consider an example of a Markov game with lack of information on one side, that was .rst introduced by Renault (2002). We compute both the value and optimal strategies for a range of parameter values.

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary...

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the...

The economics literature generally considers products as points in some characteristics space. Starting with Hotelling, this served as a convenient assumption, yet with more products being .exible or self-customizable to some degree it makes sense to think that products have positive measure. I...