When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gossner, Olivier ; Hörner, Johannes |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Signalling | Theorie |
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 1440 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 587537507 [GVK] hdl:10419/31211 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1440 [RePEc] |
Source: |
-
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
Khalil, Fahad, (2015)
-
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
Chan, Jimmy, (2015)
-
Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
Bhattacharya, Vivek, (2018)
- More ...
-
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
Gossner, Olivier, (2010)
-
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
Gossner, Olivier, (2010)
-
When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
Gossner, Olivier, (2006)
- More ...